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 The emergence of Private Military Security Companies has altered the way in which 
security has been perceived and delivered. Prior to the Cold War, security had fallen within 
the state’s domain and the deliverance of military services was a purely state-centric affair. 
Military downsizing has resulted in certain tasks and services being out-sourced to private 
entities. Within the last decade, these companies have grown in size and broadened the range 
of services they offer. States opting to partake in long-term military operations have 
contracted Private Military Security Companies in order to provide a troop surge and 
enhance their presence in the region. However, devolving security to a non-state entity has 
sparked concern, and options regarding methods of regulation and accountability have 
plagued the academic and policy world.  
 With states now opting to conduct military operations with a lighter footprint, the 
option to out-source certain tasks and services has provided great relief to states and granted 
certain strategic advantages. The benefits include the hiring of personnel when needed, 
contracting specialists in order to carry out certain tasks and using these companies as force 
multipliers to complete reconstruction and development projects. However, the utilisation of 
these companies can also provide serious strategic implications for states. When conducting 
counter-insurgency operations, the ability to successfully win over the local population via a 
dedicated ‘hearts and minds’ campaign is a vital aspect of the operation. The employment of 
Private Military Security Companies during the recent counter-insurgency operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has sparked great debate regarding the implications of using these 
actors during conflicts where sensitivity and active engagement are key operational 
components. If regulated successfully and held accountable for their actions, Private Military 
Security Companies could provide substantial strategic benefits to counter-insurgent forces 
who desire cultural and linguistic specialists, and a reconstruction workforce in order to 
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List of PMSCs 
NB. The following is by no means a comprehensive list as private companies are 
constantly changing their business names or creating sub-companies. The aim of this list is to 
provide names of companies that may be mentioned intermittently throughout this thesis. The 
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Main Research Question: 
 
Can Private Military Security Companies play a beneficial role in aiding 




Who are Private Military Security Companies, and what do they do? 
  
What issues are likely to arise when outsourcing roles in military operations? 
 
With the progression towards utilising a lighter footprint, are Private Military 
Security Companies the answer for future counter-insurgency operations? 
 
The end of the Cold War altered the manner in which Western states deployed their 
military personnel. By 1990, the threat of the Cold War turning hot had been extinguished 
and many Western states began to downsize their military forces and cut their defence 
budgets. Rather than maintaining a large standing army, Western states chose to use 
advanced technology alongside smaller military forces which minimized risk to their own 
troops and enhanced the speed in which military operations could be conducted. This new 
approach was known as the “Revolution in Military Affairs”1 and dominated strategic 
thought throughout the 1990s. However, a new phenomenon also began to emerge during the 
same period, yet didn’t receive the same academic or media attention until the start of the 
twenty-first century. Due to mass demobilization, large numbers of professional soldiers were 
now unemployed, and with military weaponry readily available on the open market, this 
combination led to a new actor emerging in the international sphere: the Private Military 
Security Company2.  
Although PMSCs had “provided services in over 110 countries since 1990”3, they 
failed to capture the world’s attention until their role in the 2003 Iraq War. This conflict saw 
an unprecedented amount of PMSCs being utilised to help coalition forces provide stability to 
                                                          
1 From this point forward referred to as RMA. 
2 From this point forward referred to as PMSC. Please see chapter one for further discussion on the definition 
and roles of PMSCs. 
3 Tripoldi, P. and Wolfendale, J. “New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World”, 
(Ashgate, Surrey, 2011), p.137.  
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the region. It has been estimated that 68,200 contractors were deployed in 2009 alone.4 
Although “Operation Enduring Freedom5 and Iraqi Freedom6 showcased the dazzling 
technological capability and professional prowess of the US military in conventional 
operations,”7coalition forces had failed to plan and prepare for the reconstruction effort 
needed in the aftermath of war. The failure to provide security and stability in these regions 
allowed insurgencies to develop.  Insurgent forces used the disaffected local populations as a 
means for gathering supplies, intelligence and support. Insurgents infamously use hit and run 
tactics, choosing to surprise their enemy with sharp attacks on infrastructure and bases, 
before melting back under the cover of the local population in order to avoid active 
engagement. Coalition forces struggled to counter the insurgencies of the twenty-first century 
due to a shortage of manpower. Large troop numbers were needed to defeat the insurgency, 
to protect the local population and to aid the reconstruction effort. Yet Western militaries had 
recently down-sized both their standing armies and defence budgets, therefore modern 
counter-insurgency operations were forced to acquire the expertise of PMSCs who could 
carry out traditional military tasks and provide a troop surge when needed. 
 This decision was heavily criticised by the media and military practitioners who 
argued that “they (PMSCs) have hindered efforts to end wars and broker peace.”8 Other 
sceptics believe that “these new actors are an impediment to the success of the very same 
operations they are meant to support.”9 Despite this new actor existing for nearly twenty 
years, a distinct “lack of clarity remains over the exact relationship between states and 
PMSCs.”10Confusion surrounding these groups and the role they play in modern military 
operations is highly contested yet often overlooked in academic literature. Critics argue that 
outsourcing traditional military tasks to a non-state entity reduces the state’s monopoly on 
violence11, leading to situations of distrust amongst nation states and a failure of democracy, 
whilst enhancing the possibility of error and abuses. Hoyne argues that the “use of PMSCs is 
                                                          
4 Extract from the American Congressional Research Service Report (2009), taken from Polman, L. “War 
Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times”, (Viking Press, London, 2010), p.137. 
5 The US led operation began in October 2001 and was designed to eradicate Al Qaeda, the group responsible 
for the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, and remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. 
6 The US and British led operation designed to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in March 2003. 
7 Long, A. “On Other War: Lessons from five decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research”, (RAND, USA, 
2006), p.ix.  
8 Shearer, D. “Outsourcing War”, Foreign Policy, No: 112, Autumn 1998, p.69.  
9 Petersohn, U. “The Other Side of the COIN: Private Security Companies and Counter-Insurgency Operations”, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume: 34, No: 10, 2011, p.782.  
10 Isenberg, D. “Private Military Contractors and US Grand Strategy”, PIRO, Oslo, Report, No: 1, 2009, p.37. 
11 See Avant. D. “The Market for Force: Consequences of Privatising Security”, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005) and Singer, P. W. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry”, 
(Cornell University, USA, 2008).   
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not necessarily at odds with COIN12 strategy.”13 Although incidents14 have occurred in 
modern operations which highlighted the need for greater regulation within the private 
military sector, it has become apparent that, if regulated and utilised effectively, PMSCs 
could offer a strategic advantage when attempting to counter an insurgency. PMSCs and 
military forces operate in the same environment, which enhances the security presence in the 
region and creates greater opportunities for intelligence collection which could be beneficial 
in aiding both the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign and the counter-insurgency.  
This thesis seeks to outline the advantages and disadvantages regarding the utilisation 
of PMSCs in counter-insurgent operations and their role within ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaigns. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘hearts and minds’ is understood as “a tactic which 
sees the exchange of material rewards for information, co-operation and political support.”15 
The first chapter will define what is meant by a PMSC, as well as defining the roles and 
characteristics of these groups. The chapter will briefly highlight conflicting debates 
regarding the definition of these groups, but the main aim is to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the term which will act as a platform in which the remainder of the thesis 
will be built upon. The second chapter will highlight the positive roles PMSCs can play in 
counter-insurgent operations. Throughout this chapter, examples will be given demonstrating 
how their approaches and skills could be beneficial to ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. The 
following chapter will then examine some of the main problems caused by outsourcing; many 
examples have been drawn from the recent conflict in Iraq but could be issues typical of any 
operation. The final chapter analyses recommendations put forward by academics and 
practitioners regarding the best methods to solve issues regarding the outsourcing of military 
tasks. Having examined the pros and cons, as well as possible recommendations, the 
concluding chapter will seek to determine whether PMSCs can play a role in modern counter-
insurgency operations.  
                                                          
12 From this point forward counter-insurgency may be referred to as COIN.  
13 Hoyne, A. “Navigating the Blackwater: Private Security Contractors and Iraqi Counter-Insurgency”, 
published at the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, USA, Volume: 8, 2010, taken from 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~worldoutlook/archives/winter10/blackwater.pdf accessed  13th February 2012, 
p.53.  
14Infamous incidents involving PMSCs include the 2004 Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal and 2007 Nisour 
Square tragedy. In 2004, a number of Iraqi detainees were subjected to horrific acts of abuse and interrogation 
by coalition forces and private military contractors. At Nisour Square, Blackwater contractors fired upon and 
killed 17 Iraqi civilians when they believed a potential ambush situation was unfolding. Reports later confirmed 
all civilians were unarmed. 
15 Wheeler, V. and Harmer, A. “Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian 




Insurgency warfare is likely to remain the chosen method used by weaker groups 
hoping to achieve strategic success against their stronger, technologically advanced enemy. It 
is vital to gain a comprehensive understanding of this type of warfare and the role that new 
actors play. With Western forces utilising a lighter footprint, and with no ambitions to 
increase their force size, PMSCs are likely to remain within the operational field. General 
David Petraeus spoke before Congress in January 2007 stating that “the US military would 
not be able to function in Iraq at all without contract personnel.”16As the phenomena is 
showing no signs of receding, it is important to gain a greater understanding of these groups 
and their position in the international and strategic landscape.  
The key to countering an insurgency is to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local 
population, as it this group that provides the support, supplies and cover for the insurgent to 
operate. Although Galula17 coined the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ during the Malayan 
campaign, the importance of gaining the population’s support in order to stem the insurgency 
is widely acknowledged. Mao “characterized the relationship between the local population 
and the fighters as water to fish, and he stressed the need to go to extraordinary lengths to 
maintain the people’s goodwill.”18 Contemporary theorists now acknowledge that the bid to 
win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population needs to be undertaken by all actors 
working within the field, not just military forces. Mackinlay recognises that “the population 
is the vital ground; winning their support is a key objective for the military, the insurgents 
and the humanitarian actors.”19 Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have included a 
multitude of actors including humanitarian groups, military personnel and PMSCs. With 
winning the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign the key strategic objective for counter-insurgent 
forces, it is crucial that the role PMSCs play in modern counter-insurgency operations is 
analysed and understood. In-depth analysis is needed to determine whether it is possible for 
PMSCs to work alongside military forces in a holistic manner, providing a strategic 
advantage for counter-insurgent forces, or whether the use of these groups has an adverse 
effect when attempting to gain support from the local population.  
                                                          
16 Petraeus, D. Lt. Gen., January 2007. In answer to a question put forward by Senator John McCain at the 
hearing before the United States Armed Service Command, 110th Congress, Washington D.C. 2007.  
17 Galula, D. “Pacification in Algeria, 1956-8”, (RAND, Pittsburgh, 2006). 
18 Tse-Tsung, M. “On Guerrilla War”, translated by Samuel B Griffith, (Fort Bragg, NC – Army Special 
Warfare School, 1989), p.132.  
19 Mackinlay, J. “Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan”, (RUSI Whitehall Paper No: 




 A multitude of sources have been examined in order to provide a comprehensive 
account of the role PMSCs play in modern counter-insurgency efforts and their effect on 
‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Although PMSCs have been heavily used in modern 
operations, little statistical data was collated until 200720, therefore it is exceptionally 
difficult to access and interpret quantitative data. The majority of data used for this thesis is 
qualitative with the central portion of the literature being derived from secondary sources.  
The topic’s focus on modern counter-insurgency operations resulted in sources being 
derived from the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although literature on both 
conflicts acknowledges PMSCs play a role, the 2003 Iraq War was chosen to be used as a 
running case-study throughout this thesis. The conflict in Iraq saw an unprecedented amount 
of PMSCs being utilised, therefore a large body of literature exists. Rather than dedicate a 
chapter of the thesis to the conflict in Iraq, the decision was made to run the theme 
throughout the thesis, thereby highlighting the benefits or ramifications of using PMSCs in 
counter-insurgency operations alongside wider discussions. Highlighting the context in which 
these issues have emerged is critical to understanding the topic, and producing analytical 
assessments detailing the role of the private industry in modern operations. 
 Although conducting my own interviews would have been interesting and possibly 
provided new information relating to the topic, the practicalities such as limited timeframes 
prevented this from occurring. Due to the nature of the topic, interviews with contractors 
would have been difficult, as the industry still retains an element of secrecy and contracted 
personnel are often forbidden to disclose information or provide interviews, except in closely 
monitored circumstances. However interviews documented by Nick Bicanic21 have provided 
an insightful look into the industry and the populations they work within.  
 Since 2002 academic work relating to the topic of PMSCs has increased and provides 
a useful, comprehensive understanding of the industry. Most of the works published are 
descriptive rather than analytical, but remain relevant due to highlighting the main debates 
within the field and conflicting definitions. Reports by the UN and other legal institutions are 
                                                          
20 The Nisour Square Incident in 2007 prompted the US government to take greater responsibility and gather 
data in relation to contractors working in Iraq. Although figures were produced by the Department of Defense 
detailing the number of contractors operating in the region, these figures were often estimated and lacked 
validity therefore would need to be analysed with caution.  
21 Purpose films (2006), “Shadow Company: The Rules of War have Changed”, directed by Nick Bicanic and 
Jason Bourque, DVD.  
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beneficial when contemplating the legal frameworks and definitional debates on the subject 
matter. Websites have been an excellent resource with regard to understanding the private 
military industry. Their mission statements or job vacancies advertised online provide an 
insightful look into the industry. The use of manuals and reviews provide an invaluable 
insight into a country’s military outlook on the topic, and how training has adapted to 
incorporate these groups or methods used to operate alongside private forces. These sources 
are vital for understanding different perspectives and relationships between PMSCs and 
military forces. Journals and newspaper articles are crucial resources as the media plays a 
detrimental role in ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Close analysis of the incidents, and the way 
in which they are reported, is valuable for my research. Biographical works, memoirs and 
journals by company executives, contracted personnel and military forces, provide a realistic 
cultural and strategic outlook on the difficulties of operating within a counter-insurgency 
environment, and the varying roles within ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns.  
 Close analysis needs to be made with regard to any of the above sources. The 
audience in which they were written for needs to be understood and analysed accordingly. 
With two forces operating within the same environment, bias and animosity is a recurring 
issue when researching the topic. Both groups attribute blame to the other and justify their 
failures based on the shortfalls of others. However, these issues also provide a unique 
perspective on how groups view the topic, relationships within the operational sphere and 
possible avenues for further research. The consultation of a wide variety of sources was 
needed in order to outweigh the negatives of certain sources with the positives of another, 
whilst also ensuring an in-depth and comprehensive analysis resulted on the topic in question.  
Literature Review: 
 Due to the nature of my topic, no single piece of literature has provided relevance. 
Instead a number of sources have been examined in order to provide a comprehensive 
account detailing the role PMSCs play in counter-insurgency operations, and whether they 
can aid counter-insurgent’s efforts to win ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Academic literature 
on the topic of PMSCs was scarce during the 1990s. However in 2002, there was a sudden 
interest and influx in the amount of academic works being published. Academics began to 
discuss the emergence of these new actors and a great debate regarding the definition of these 
groups ensued. In 2006, literature on the topic was enhanced again when, based on the role of 
PMSCs in Iraq, academics began to discuss methods of regulation and issues regarding 
15 
 
accountability. Although literature on the topic has emerged slowly in the last decade, there 
still remains a distinct lack of works analysing the impact of PMSCs operating in counter-
insurgency operations. Practitioners have noted that most academic literature on the topic is 
descriptive and not analytical.22  
 Academic literature on the topic is divided into two main schools of thought; 
the Abolitionist or Pessimist School, and the Optimist School. Both schools have been useful 
in gauging the diversity of viewpoints surrounding the topic. Prior to 2004, the majority of 
academic works produced on the topic focused on the negative implications of PMSCs and 
sought ways to eradicate these groups from international society. This school of thought was 
known as the Abolitionist or Pessimist School, labelling PMSCs as mercenaries in order to 
attract public support for their cause. Pessimist scholars, such as Verkuil23 advocate that the 
military is part of the government’s sovereignty and should not be privatised. The 
outsourcing of military tasks and services were deemed morally problematic. By 2004, the 
Optimist School began to emerge, arguing PMSCs could play a role in international society, 
if they were properly regulated and made accountable for their actions. Optimists believed 
PMSCs were “a provider of strategic advantage”24 if utilised accordingly. They were aware 
changes needed to be made within the industry but, as these companies were new, they were 
still evolving and finding a balance suitable for themselves and their clients. Mandel claims 
there is too much negativity within the field with many academics calling for the dismissal of 
these companies rather than seeking to analyse their importance and role they play. 25 Other 
Optimists believe that states have a new foreign policy tool in the shape of PMSCs, and that 
market incentives will help to regulate these groups.26Many Optimists such as Avant, place a 
heavy focus upon issues regarding regulation and accountability rather than providing a 
comprehensive guide to the roles conducted by PMSCs. A comprehensive guide regarding 
the composition of these groups and the roles they play is distinctly absent from academic 
literature on the topic. This thesis falls within the Optimist School, claiming that PMSCs can 
aid counter-insurgent’s efforts to win ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, but serious consideration 
needs to be made before deploying these forces.  
                                                          
22 Singer, P. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry” (Cornell University Press, 
London, 2008), p. vii. 
23 Verkuil, P. “Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions threatens democracy and 
what we can do about it”, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
24 Sheehy, B. Maogoto, J. and Newell, V. “Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation”, (Palgrave, New 
York, 2009), p.173.  
25 Mandel, R. “Armies without States: The Privatization of Security”, (Lynne Renner Publishers, London, 2002). 
26 Avant, D. “Mercenaries”, Foreign Policy. No: 143, July 2004. 
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 In order to gain a deeper understanding of the PMSC industry, works by 
Engbrecht27, Isenberg28and Jeremy Scahill29have proved invaluable. They provide detailed 
accounts regarding certain private companies, some of the roles undertaken and methods they 
employ during operations. Scahill and Isenberg both provide detailed accounts concerning 
PMSCs and their role in the recent conflict in Iraq. Their aim was to remove some of the 
secrecy surrounding the industry and enhance the corporate identity of these groups. These 
works were particularly useful when conducting research for the Iraq case-study. However, 
they only provide accounts regarding the company in which they are attached, and the 
descriptions cannot be applicable to all groups operating under the PMSC label. Literature by 
military personnel also provided an invaluable insight into the role of PMSCs during modern 
operations. Personal accounts from military personnel such as Colby Buzzell30 and James 
Fergusson31are excellent resources, highlighting the complex relationship between the private 
industry and military sector.  
Although literature surrounding the private industry is vital for my topic, the 
importance of strategic and counter-insurgent theorists must not be overlooked. The ability to 
recognise the key failings regarding counter-insurgency operations is paramount when 
analysing whether PMSCs can play a role. Clausewitz’s notion that “in war one should 
ensure not to take the first step without considering the last,”32remains relevant to modern 
counter-insurgency operations where coalition forces failed to plan for reconstruction efforts, 
and had to draft PMSCs at an alarming rate to make up for their own shortfalls. The 
importance of prior preparation and planning is crucial to any military operation and must not 
be forgotten. Machiavelli’s work also bears relevance, as he claimed that “in order to prevent 
tyranny, the army should be recruited from and at one with the local people.”33With PMSCs 
now recruiting from the countries in which they operate, it is interesting to note how 
Machiavelli’s understanding of the army recruiting from the population is relevant for the 
                                                          
27 Engbrecht, S. “America’s Covert Warriors: Inside the World of Private Military Contractors”, (Potomac 
Books Inc., Washington DC, 2011). 
28 Isenberg, D. “Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq”, (Praeger Security International, 
Westport, 2009).  
29 Scahill, J. “Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army”, (Nation Books, USA, 
2007). 
30 Buzzell, C. “My War: Killing Time in Iraq”, (Transworld Publishers, UK, 2006). 
31 Fergusson, J. “A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan”, (Transworld Publishers, 
UK,2008). 
32 Clausewitz, C. quote taken from Department of the Army, “Logistics: Army Contractors on the Battlefield”, 
Regulation 715, 31st January 1999.  
33 Machiavelli, N. taken from Grundy, K.W. “On Machiavelli and the Mercenaries”, Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Volume:6, No:3, 1968.  
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private sector, and whether his recommendation has proved to be successful. Recent counter-
insurgent theorists such as Galula34 and Thompson35 highlight the importance of winning the 
local population’s support. The strategist, Colin Gray, also understands the importance 
regarding host-nation support, but claims that “you don’t win ‘hearts and minds’ with 
soldiers; you need engineers, builders and development people.”36 Modern counter-insurgent 
theorists claim that the holistic or comprehensive approach is crucial when embarking on a 
counter-insurgency operation. The holistic or comprehensive approach combines both 
military and reconstruction efforts in order to flush out the insurgent, whilst providing 
security and development opportunities for the local population. Understanding the 
importance of the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, as well as reasons the local population feel 
alienated, are vital for my topic. As Boyle notes “counter-insurgency has a long history of 
theoretical approaches built on best practice from the direct battle experience.”37Therefore 
combining personal accounts alongside strategic thought provides an analytical and deeper 
understanding of the role PMSCs can play in counter-insurgency operations.  
Military reviews have provided further information regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of using PMSCs in counter-insurgent operations. These reviews and manuals 
provide practical guides to operating within a counter-insurgent environment, as well as 
highlighting military attitudes and grievances. Bias and animosity between the military and 
private sectors remains apparent, but using sources from both groups will help to alleviate 
this issue. The DIIS Policy Brief38 places PMSCs within the counter-insurgency environment, 
but fails to provide an in-depth analysis regarding the implications of using these groups. 
Instead, the short document provides bullet point recommendations with no causal link to the 
effect on ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Isenberg’s military review entitled “Private Military 
Contractors and US Grand Strategy”39provides a good analysis regarding US efforts to 
integrate the private military industry into their military ethos. “Contractors on the 
Battlefield”40 is an excellent piece of literature detailing the role of contractors during 
modern operations. The manual recommends greater cohesion between the regular and 
                                                          
34 Galula, D. “Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”, (Westport, Connecticut, 2007).  
35 Thompson, R. “Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons learned from Malaya and Vietnam”, (Palgrave, 
London, 1978).  
36 Gray, C. “Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice”, (Routledge, Oxon, 2006), p. 231. 
37 Boyle, M. “Terrorism and Insurgency”, taken from “Contemporary Security and Strategy” ed. Snyder, C. 
(Palgrave, New York, 2008), p.186.  
38 Moesgaard, C. “Private Military Companies in Counter-Insurgency Strategy”, DIIS Policy Brief, March 2011. 
39 Isenberg, D. “Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy”, PIRO, Oslo, Report, No: 1, 2009.  




private military industry, and is useful in examining US military understanding of the topic 
prior to the PMSC boom in 2006. Singer’s policy paper “Can’t win with ‘em, can’t go to war 
without ‘em”41 is perhaps the most comprehensive piece of literature surrounding the topic. 
He examines the roles played by contractors and whether they are helping the US win the war 
in Iraq, coining the term the “ultimate enabler” in the process. However, a heavy focus on the 
actions of Blackwater is evident, and Singer fails to give a balanced analysis of the PMSC 
industry itself, rather attributing blame and failure purely to contractors. Singer, however, 
does understand the importance of further research, as the US is locked in a vicious cycle in 
which they can’t operate ‘with them or without them’.  
The final chapter in this thesis examines recommendations, including debates by 
different bodies regarding appropriate methods of regulation. Most literature surrounding the 
topic incorporates a chapter analysing the possible methods of regulation. Avant believes that 
as PMSCs are business entities, market incentives are the best way to regulate the industry.42 
Singer suggests that international and domestic norms are not enough to provide 
accountability. 43 He highlights the scope of military privatisation and his work remains 
modern in outlook. The ethical debate surrounding the military industry is discussed within a 
collection of essays edited by Tripoldi and Wolfendale44 and Eric Heinze.45 Carmola46also 
examines the ethical debate, yet is more concerned about the impact on state sovereignty and 
the state losing their monopoly on violence, rather than analysing the ethical role of PMSCs. 
The concluding chapter draws together a range of sources in order to provide an analytical 





                                                          
41 Singer, P. “Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counter-
Insurgency”, Washington D.C., Brookings Institute, Policy Paper No: 4,  September 2007. 
42 Avant. D. “The Market for Force: Consequences of Privatising Security”, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005). 
43 Singer, P. “Corporate Warriors” (London, 2008). 
44 Tripoldi, P. and Wolfendale, J. “New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World”, 
(Ashgate, Surrey, 2011).  
45 Heinze, E. and Steele, B. “Ethics and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition”, (Palgrave, New 
York, 2009).  




Chapter One: Private Military Security Companies in the 
Twenty- First Century. 
Fighting for your country is seen as noble and patriotic, whilst fighting for a non-state 
entity is seen as immoral and perverse. Those fighting for a country or group in which they 
do not hold national or residential allegiance often choose to participate for financial gain. 
This motivation leads to heavy criticism suggesting that the individuals are lacking morals 
due to the ability to kill for financial reasons. Labels such as “dogs of war” or the “whores of 
war” are used to describe these groups, and are often ill-received within society and military 
spheres. Officially known as mercenaries, these groups are commonly described as 
“individuals who fight for financial gain in foreign conflicts that are primarily used by non-
state armed groups.”47 Although “hiring outsiders to fight battles is as old as war itself,”48 
the emergence of a new actor during the 1990s sparked further debates regarding the sale of 
services and the outsourcing phenomenon. Certain academics refute the idea that a new actor 
has emerged, claiming that they are merely sophisticated mercenaries49whilst others 
recognise a new actor exists which needs to be categorized appropriately.50  
During the 1990s, Western states downsized their military forces leaving large 
amounts of personnel unemployed, facing a job market which didn’t require the military 
combat skills they possessed. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, small inter-state 
conflicts broke out, but Western militaries were reluctant to send peace-keeping forces, so 
newly formed private military companies rushed to fill the security gap. In the twenty-first 
century, Western militaries were over-stretched trying to conduct counter-insurgency 
operations and reconstruction tasks in both Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in the private 
military industry emerging once again to offer their services. These groups offered military 
and security services for a price and were often attributed the term “mercenary”, yet many 
academics and the companies themselves, adamantly argue that they are a new security actor 
with different values to the blood-thirsty mercenaries of the past.  
Unlike mercenaries these new actors do not operate alone, instead they work in 
groups for large companies who have a hierarchical chain of command. They are hired by 
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companies who understand the security gap, and select teams of individuals with certain 
skills sets, to act as a solution to the client’s problem. For many academics, the vital 
difference between mercenaries and the new actors is the structure of the groups. Mercenaries 
are “individuals who fights for a state other than his own, or for a non state entity to which he 
has no direct tie, for financial gain”51 whereas the new actor offering security, works within 
a corporate multi-national company with a board of directors and established hiring criteria. 
Individuals working for these companies are listed on a database alongside their specific 
skills set, then carefully selected and hired based on the specific needs of the operation in 
question. This allows the companies to “target market niches by offering packaged services 
covering a wide variety of military skills sets.”52 
 Academics within the Optimist School regard the difference in clientele as a 
distinguishing factor between mercenaries and these groups. Mercenaries often work for the 
highest bidder with little link or care for the background of the operation. This new actor has 
traditionally only worked for states, and the company usually “only accepts contracts from 
the state in which they operate.”53 Therefore, as a large amount of the companies offering 
military and security services operate out of the US and UK, they tend to have a stronger 
allegiance to, and work for, these countries. As reputation is a vital component within the 
business world, these companies are conscious of their image and choose to work only for 
reputable clients. Tonkin notes that “tens of thousands of contractors working for private 
military and security companies (PMSCs) now provide a wide range of services to states, 
international organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations around the 
world.”54 Generally speaking “most have refrained from signing contracts with non-state 
armed actors stating they will only work for internationally recognised governments.”55In 
their mission statement, Academi claim to work only for the US and their clients, “we 
provide risk and threat assessment services in support of US government clients.”56Those 
supporting the notion that a new security actor has emerged, claim that the financial 
reasoning also differentiates these actors from mercenaries. Singer states that these new 
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actors are “driven by business profit not individual profit.”57 Enhancing their reputation, and 
providing a good service, are important factors as it increases their chance of being hired 
again which makes good business sense and improves profits.  
 The types of services these companies provide have also increased in scope. The 
majority of these companies claim to offer combat service support which entails a range of 
services from logistics, interrogation services and security duties. The types of services 
offered fall into three broad categories of external security support; operational support, 
military advice and training, and logistical support.58 Mercenaries tend to only offer combat 
military services, whereas this new actor identifies gaps within state capabilities and offers 
support services which would enhance their military capacity. This can include “site security, 
international civilian police, police training, crime prevention and intelligence.”59 Other 
tasks often seen as non-military assignments, such as “transportation, telecommunications, 
food, laundry, and other administrative services as well as setting up and taking down 
temporary bases and camps,”60 can all be outsourced and conducted by these new actors. 
Due to military overstretch; some of the basic roles traditionally carried out by military 
personnel are now outsourced to private companies, allowing the military to focus on other 
tasks which could be detrimental to operational success. Due to the highly technical nature of 
modern warfare, companies are able to provide personnel who specialise in operating or 
fixing modern weapons systems. As many of the individuals working for these companies are 
ex-military or police, they already possess a range of security and military skills, and are 
often used to train people in similar professions. The company Trojan “distinguishes itself by 
recruiting highly motivated and professional personnel, drawn from various international 
military, special operations, law enforcement and commercial agencies. These personnel 
have exceptional worldwide experience and are renowned for dealing with high-risk 
situations and complex operations.”61 Other companies such as MPRI claim to “help develop 
resources and establish sustainable infrastructures to promote and support human 
rights…we evaluate situations, then we design and conduct training that helps individuals 
take charge of their future.”62 
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 The term given to this new actor has sparked great debate and is constantly being 
adapted. Although it has become commonly assumed that a new actor has emerged based on 
the characteristics determined above, the inability to provide a name that can be used to 
describe this new actor has plagued the field. Private Military Company (PMC), Private 
Security Company (PSC), Private Military Firm (PMF) and Private Military Security 
Company (PMSC) are all used within the field, often describing the same groups who 
complete similar tasks, yet academics continue to produce new acronyms in order to describe 
these actors adding to the confusion. Williams argues that there “is a clear distinction 
between PMCs and PSCs- PMCs do military tasks, PSCs do policing tasks.”63In reality this 
distinction is not so clear, as many companies offer to carry out both tasks. The term Private 
Military Security Company (PMSC) has recently been put forward by a number of academics 
who wish to create one acronym that can be universally applied to cover the outsourcing of 
military and security tasks to the private sector. PMSC will be used throughout this thesis as 
the term is the most comprehensive and appropriate title for the actors I wish to analyse. 
Although the acronyms PSC, PMF and PMC may be used throughout this thesis, when 
quoting directly from academic literature, it is commonly assumed within the field that these 
terms are used to describe members of the newly formed acronym PMSC.  
 After 2002, PMSCs were recognised as a new actor and further debates regarding 
their place within international frameworks began to emerge. Article 4.(A).(1) of the Third 
Geneva Convention states that “unless PMSCs are incorporated into the armed forces of a 
state, they are not lawful combatants and could be individually prosecuted for 
participating.”64A lack of clarity regarding their position within legal frameworks continues 
to prove problematic. Singer highlights this issue, claiming that “on the contractor side, the 
lack of clarity means that if they are captured, it is up to their adversaries to define their 
status.”65 If the enemy classifies them as prisoners of war (POW), then they will be held until 
hostilities end and be immune from persecution. Yet if the enemy claims they are unlawful 
combatants or civilians, they are liable for prosecution under domestic law and have less 
immunity in cases of abuse. The lack of accountability measures and control mechanisms 
faced by PMSCs highlights the need for legal frameworks to evolve and incorporate these 
new actors so that abuses, both by and against private contractors, are removed.  
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 Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) is the name given to companies that 
seek to provide states or other governmental organisations with enhanced military or security 
capabilities. These companies operate as businesses, identifying a market niche and choosing 
the best contractors for the job from a database listing their specific skills set. This package is 
then sold to clients in need of military or security services. These companies have increased 
in size and broadened the range of skills on offer, and many claim that “the regular armed 
forces are now so dependent upon private contractors that the US Army would break down 
without them.”66 Between 2003 and 2007, the US awarded around US $85 billion to PMSCs 
to carry out contracts in the Iraqi theatre alone.67 As the market and needs of clients evolve, 
the range of services on offer from these companies will also expand. PMSCs are considered 
more legitimate than mercenaries, due to their business-like structures and the notion that 
market incentives, such as the need to maintain good public relations and positive reputation, 
are key factors in regulating their behaviour. Chesterman summarises the definition of, and 
roles these actors play, as “firms providing services outside their home states with the 
potential for use of lethal force, as well as training of and advice to militaries that 
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Chapter Two: The Missing Puzzle Piece: Private Military 
Security Companies and their role in Hearts and Minds 
Campaigns 
 The local population is the centre of gravity for both the insurgent and counter-
insurgent force therefore, in order to achieve success on the battlefield; each force must strive 
to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people in order to deny his enemy any strategic 
advantage. Eyal states “the only reliable means of winning ‘hearts and minds’ is to play to 
the pragmatism of insecure and unhappy people by providing for their basic needs: first the 
cessation of violence and imposition of law and order; and then shelter, food and water, 
medicine and hygiene, and power.”69 Counter-insurgent forces often find themselves 
overstretched due to attempting to defeat an insurgency, whilst providing manpower for 
reconstruction projects, and dedicating time and effort to a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. 
PMSCs have been recognised for providing troop surges as and when needed, but they also 
offer a wealth of skills and services that, if utilised correctly, could prove advantageous to 
counter-insurgent forces struggling to maintain ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns during COIN 
operations.  
 The inability to conduct their daily routines without the fear of threat and violence is a 
serious grievance felt by local populations during times of conflict. A key objective when 
conducting a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, is the ability to provide security to the people. 
Military planners in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to foresee the need for large quantities of 
ground troops. In Iraq, there was a significant lack of troops to secure the region and, coupled 
with the disbandment of the Iraqi Army and Police forces, resulted in the insurgency taking 
hold. Ledwidge noted “there were simply too few soldiers to have more than the slightest 
occasional effect on security at a local level.”70The coalition forces contracted PMSCs to 
provide a troop surge, and to enhance the security presence in the region. A greater security 
presence will help the local population feel safe and bolster support for the counter-insurgent. 
By portraying a degree of normality and strength, communities will continue with their social 
and commercial routines, denying insurgent forces a chance to feed from the local 
populations. 
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 Due to a shortage of ground troops, coalition forces operating in Iraq failed to tackle 
the insurgency whole-heartedly due to the need to sacrifice troops to provide security at bases 
and other installations. The extra personnel provided by PMSCs allow counter-insurgent 
forces to conduct a more efficient COIN campaign, rather than providing a half-hearted 
approach which lengthens the conflict and furthers grievances with the local population. 
PMSCs help free up resources and allow troops to focus on their war fighting competencies. 
When interviewing military personnel operating in Iraq, Singer found that many were 
“grateful to have someone help them bear the burden.”71 PMSCs could be used to seal the 
borders and limit insurgent forces entering the region. They are “not just force multipliers, 
but also effective counter-insurgent forces in their own right.”72 Contractors usually have a 
military or security background, therefore are able to pass on vital information to the military 
regarding suspicious behaviour, or use tried and tested methods to limit the impact of the 
insurgency on the local populations. Isenberg discovered that many contractors are “veterans 
of anti-insurgency conflicts in Colombia, Algeria…or who fought in the Russian 
government’s war in Chechnya,”73 therefore hold operational knowledge. The Security 
Companies Association regularly met in Iraq to exchange information regarding the conflict. 
The SCA provided greater cohesion amongst contractors and demonstrated to local 
populations and the military that they took their roles seriously and cared about the outcome 
of operations.  
 Security is also provided to non-governmental organisations74 and other humanitarian 
actors. These groups need to reach the local populations to provide aid or complete 
reconstruction projects, but are unable to, due to the threat of violence. Eyal discovered that 
“outside NGOs seemed rather hide-bound in their insistence on having all security in place 
before they got on with business.”75 In Iraq, NGOs already working within the field 
threatened to abandon projects due to the fear of violence, “development companies say they 
will need to cancel the contracts because their employees cannot work safely.”76 This has an 
adverse effect on the local population, who grow to resent the forces operating within their 
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country, for not being able to provide security and denying them their basic resources and 
needs. PMSCs can play a vital role in counter-insurgency operations, as they are able to 
provide security to humanitarian actors which do not detract resources from the military 
forces, and ensures the delivery of aid and continuance of reconstruction efforts in the region. 
This will then have a positive impact on the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, as the local 
populations approve of the effort made to provide stability and support. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has used PMSCs throughout the Iraq War, in order to 
ensure their workers have a safe passage when delivering aid throughout the country. PMSCs 
have also received contracts to deliver humanitarian aid themselves, “private companies are 
increasingly moving into NGOs areas of competence, where they have taken on the 
reconstruction of schools, hospitals, providing water as well as the distribution of vaccines 
and food.”77 This builds a stronger relationship between the private industry and the local 
population due to heightened interaction between the two groups and the knowledge that 
these groups do care about well-being. Combining civilian and military personnel offered a 
degree of legitimacy that insurgent forces failed to provide, as they could not rely on civilian 
forces to provide external services. Civilian and military factions working together became 
known as the Provincial Reconstruction Team Model and, according to Long, “should be 
expanded and made the basis for current and future COIN efforts.”78Ensuring provisions 
reach their destination and reconstruction projects are completed, is vital when attempting to 
provide stability and reassurance to the local populations and win ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaigns.  
 Security is also provided through the reestablishment of law and order. In Afghanistan 
and Iraq, PMSCs were used by coalition forces to train local nationals in policing and 
military duties. This is a key process of any counter-insurgency campaign, as it allows the 
local population and government to reinstall authority, normality and legitimacy throughout 
the country. The PMSC industry broadened their services and increased “their involvement in 
the Security Sector Reform programmes by training police, military and government officials 
for the home state.”79 Isenberg noted that contractors working for PMSCs were “far more 
likely to have a background in the combat arms sector, or policing at a minimum, if not 
                                                          
77 Mackinlay, J. “Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan”,(RUSI Whitehall Paper No:64, 
2005, Great Britain), p.44. 
78 Long, A. “On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counter-Insurgency Research”, (RAND, 
USA, 2006), p.xii.  
79 Mackinlay, J. “Defeating Complex Insurgency”,(Great Britain, 2005), p.44. 
27 
 
special operations training and experience.”80 This is advantageous for counter-insurgent 
forces, as they can outsource the training of new military and police forces to PMSCs, who 
have a wealth of experience and knowledge, ensuring continuance of the core objective of 
defeating the insurgent. Rebuilding the military and police force increases law and order 
throughout the region, whilst encouraging the population to return to normality after a bloody 
conflict. As the provider of such training, PMSCs are helping the counter-insurgent force to 
be seen as the legitimate provider of security, with the local population more likely to ally 
their support to this force rather than the insurgent. 
The inclusion of high-end technical weapon systems has enhanced pressure on an 
already stretched and limited military force. The counter-insurgent force needs to ensure a 
maximum force presence is felt so that the local population feels secure and the insurgency 
can be controlled and stemmed quickly. Rather than commit military personnel, it would be 
beneficial to outsource the operation and maintenance tasks needed for these weapons 
systems to civilians. Civilians operating in Iraq helped provide operational support for B-2 
stealth bombers, F-117 stealth fighters, Global Hawks, UAVs, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, 
the M-1 tanks, the Apache helicopters, and many Navy ships.81 Although outsourcing incurs 
financial costs, the figures associated with investing and training military personnel are high, 
as they are more at risk of being killed or leaving the military sector. Not only do these 
companies provide employees with the latest training and understanding with regard to these 
systems, they also provide a maintenance team which also reduces the need to constantly 
retrain military personnel to deal with mechanical issues. As “most of the information systems 
used by the world’s modern forces are designed, developed, and managed by civilians,”82 it 
has become common business sense to use the expertise of these civilians, rather than waste 
financial and military resources. Some policymakers believe that outsourcing could limit 
collateral damage. Incidents of UAVs and drone attacks accidentally targeting civilians can 
have a detrimental impact on ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Investigative reports have often 
attributed error to personnel feeling under stress or long working hours within the military 
sphere. Hiring civilians to complete these, and only these tasks, could reduce the margin of 
error and avoid alienating the population further. It is vital to “not kill the innocent if you can 
possibly avoid it, do not unnecessarily damage their property, and certainly do not wreck the 
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infrastructures of their society.”83 The outsourcing of certain weapons systems can alleviate 
stress and pressure on an already fraught military sector, as well as inducing cost-effective 
benefits.  
Individuals working for PMSCs can provide a wealth of skills and benefits to a 
counter-insurgency campaign. Many contractors are ex-Special Forces, therefore have 
experience operating amongst the people, specialist combat training, desirable language skills 
and cultural awareness. Military personnel have been criticised for their lack of cultural 
understanding during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, with offending local 
cultures and the failure to learn language skills prior to deployment noted as the main 
charges. The diversity of PMSCs produces greater cultural awareness and enhanced language 
capabilities. These skills are often placed within a database, therefore it is possible to “list 
individuals by experience and speciality so contractors can custom-fit each job with qualified 
employees.”84 Due to the geographic uncertainty of future operations, PMSCs are a useful 
tool when language skills or interpreters are needed at short notice. Good military interpreters 
take at least three years to train85, therefore the ability to hire people when needed is 
beneficial. The cosmopolitan make-up of these groups can help develop relations with the 
local population. The local populace are more likely to support and communicate with 
someone who shares a similar cultural outlook or national appearance. The use of the 
Ghurkhas by the British Military has always proven to be strategically effective as they “are 
very good at public interface…they are naturally friendly, and being non-Europeans they are 
often more easily accepted.”86 Having a similar cultural understanding to the population you 
are working within can help contractors empathise with local populations, and this will open 
up lines of communication. The multi-cultural make-up of PMSCs can also enhance 
contractor’s cultural awareness and knowledge. As Donald Rumsfeld noted “private 
contractors come from many different backgrounds, they provide a different outlook”87which 
can be useful in assessing situations, and providing training and advice to others operating 
within the same environment. Many “advocates of privatization argue that, because of their 
greater experience and specialization, military contractors are far more efficient than their 
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uniformed counterparts”88 in providing cultural understanding and respect which is a vital 
component when attempting to win the support of local populations. Understanding and 
communicating with the local population is a core strategic objective when hoping to conduct 
a successful ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. 
The ability to converse with the local population and understand their customs, 
culture and values, is a crucial factor when attempting to gather intelligence. Counter-
insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan saw an over-reliance on technological 
sources89 when collecting intelligence data. As the centre of gravity is the population, 
intelligence gathered on the enemy via the local people is crucial to the success of the 
campaign. As PMSCs also operate amongst the local population, they are subject to a wealth 
of open source90 intelligence which can be collected from human sources91during routine 
tasks. PMSCs also have a greater “freedom of movement often denied to armed 
forces”92which gives them greater opportunities to collect intelligence for counter-insurgent 
forces. Mackinlay noted that PMSCs were “likely to have a wider footprint than UK forces – 
British PSCs operate throughout Iraq, conventional forces do not.”93PMSCs are therefore 
able to provide a better geographic and cultural understanding of the region, and have the 
ability to provide country reports which can be used by counter-insurgent forces. PMSCs 
spend more time operating within the local populations, therefore have more opportunities to 
engage with people and gather intelligence. The local populace are more likely to approach 
PMSCs to offer information, as many do not wear a national uniform; there is less of a risk 
than providing information to a military force. As one contractor noted, “our intel was 
usually more accurate and up to date than the military’s.”94 Counter-insurgent forces could 
gain greater insight into the region in which they are operating, and the population in which 
they are working amongst, if they liaise with PMSCs. Contractors are excellent resources and 
have the ability to provide a wealth of open source intelligence, but greater cohesion with the 
military is needed to ensure intelligence provided is timely and relevant. 
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  PMSCs also opt to hire nationals from the country in which they are operating. 
Although hiring personnel from the local population needs to be thoughtfully considered, this 
process can also enhance relations between the counter-insurgent force and the local 
populace. The decision to hire local contractors provides a workforce with knowledge of the 
local customs and regions. They are able to act as a ‘middle-man’ between the local 
population and counter-insurgent force, thus building relations and trust between the two 
groups. Hoyne discovered that “private contractors’ ability to hire local personnel allows for 
a lower profile, which only enhances everyone’s safety.”95Enhancing the safety of the local 
population is advantageous when building relations. Employing nationals provides the local 
population with employment, whilst also helping to kick-start the local economy. The 
Wartime Contracting Review noted that “using local contractors not only supports the local 
economy, but often helps the United States develop a good rapport with the host nation.”96A 
study by Isenberg found that local nationals employed within the private industry have 
“conducted themselves professionally and are more in tune with the local culture than are 
regular US military forces.”97In Iraq, as of March 2011, “from approximately 90,000 
contractors, 20,000 were US citizens, 24,000 were third-country nationals, and 46,000 were 
local nationals.”98 Not only does the employment of nationals encourage support from the 
local population, it also enhances support from outside nations, who are less likely to see the 
counter-insurgency as a neo-colonialist expedition. The US COIN Doctrine recognised that a 
“multi-national approach…is an aspect of counter-insurgency which is most likely to get the 
support of other nations.”99 
 Military forces complete rotational tours of duty, with each tour lasting a maximum of 
twelve months. Frequent rotations were criticised as counter-insurgent forces were unable to 
build relationships with the communities in which they operated, “many soldiers were 
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leaving the theatre just as they were becoming proficient at their assignment.”100As the next 
wave of counter-insurgent forces moved into the operational space, new relationships had to 
be forged and winning the support of the locals was exceptionally difficult. Academics 
acknowledged that as “contractors generally continue in the same position for longer periods 
than troops, there is less need for constant retraining”101 and greater possibilities for building 
long-term relationships with the local population. Contractors tended to live amongst the 
local population, unlike military forces who lived on bases, sharing their environment and 
creating more opportunities to actively engage with them. Mackinlay believed PMSCs 
offered an advantage to ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, as it “made sense to contract a PSC 
whose sub-contractors would be able to allocate eleven months rather than one, and who 
would have operational experience and thus be able to read the local security picture.”102  
 As counter-insurgency operations are lengthy, the ability to sustain a conflict and 
good relations with the local population are important considerations. It is also essential that 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the home population are acknowledged. This aspect is often 
forgotten, as Spear notes “the second front in the battle for ‘hearts and minds’ that is 
sometimes under-appreciated: the battle on the home front in the state conducting the 
counter-insurgency.”103 The home state provides the money and personnel needed to fight 
the conflict which, if lengthy, can cause great resentment and have enormous political costs 
for the government involved. The Vietnam War demonstrated how the ‘body bag’ 
syndrome104 could have a detrimental effect on public support, altering the outcome of a 
conflict. Yet PMSCs are often over-looked by home populations, who fail to recognise this 
force exists, or that they operate under their country’s domain. There is a distinct lack of 
“public outcry when contractors are called up and deployed.”105Carmola found that military 
deaths spark outrage and can lose the support of the home nation, but the “benefit of the use 
of contractors is that their casualties go unrecognised or unreported.”106Cockburn claimed 
that PMSCs “are quite literally cannon fodder since nobody in their home countries either 
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knew or cared if they were killed.”107When conducting lengthy operations, it is vital to ensure 
that troop casualties are minimised in order to maintain public support. As Isenberg notes, 
“the use of PMCs receives less attention than the use of regular troops, which reduces the 
political costs of using force.”108Contractor casualties are not included in official tolls; 
therefore they do not command the same implications as military deaths. For counter-
insurgent forces, the use of PMSCs is seen as beneficial when trying to pacify the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the home population. 
 The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted many issues faced by 
counter-insurgent forces. The need for quick troop surges, longer tours of duty, enhanced 
security presence, and greater cultural awareness, and HUMINT collection have all been 
acknowledged as serious contentions needing to be dealt with. Although PMSCs are new 
actors, still evolving within the international sphere, they can play a beneficial role by 
providing services to counter-insurgent forces which remove the above issues. They “offer 
the potential backdrop of additional forces but at no political cost,”109command a wide 
variety of cultural skills and security experience, and can be utilised when the military option 
is no longer sustainable. PMSCs provide services that can enhance the counter-insurgent’s 
war-fighting capabilities, but can also enhance security and active engagement with the local 
populations which is a crucial objective of a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. PMSCs can be 
regarded as the ‘missing puzzle piece’, as they provide a wealth of benefits countering the 
issues faced by counter-insurgent forces. By enhancing cohesion between the two groups, and 
adopting a more holistic approach, PMSCs could play a beneficial role during counter-
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Chapter Three: Implications for using Private Military Security 
Contractors during Counter-Insurgency Operations. 
 For counter-insurgent forces, a successful ‘hearts and minds’ campaign is a crucial 
objective requiring careful attention and sensitivity. Success depends on the ability to provide 
security and support to the local people without causing harm, damaging their property or 
ruining their infrastructure. Critics argue that using PMSCs during sensitive campaigns just 
adds friction to the already complex counter-insurgency operation. Singer noted that the “use 
of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counter-
insurgency efforts of the US mission in Iraq.”110 The Abu Ghraib and Nisour Square 
incidents caused serious implications for counter-insurgent forces operating within Iraq. 
Whilst the previous chapter attempted to highlight the advantages of using PMSC forces 
within population-centric warfare, it is crucial to examine the implications of using these 
groups to determine whether they can play a role in counter-insurgency operations. 
 A key contestation regarding the use of private forces is the lack of accountability and 
professionalism within the industry. When PMSCs first emerged they sought hard to prove 
their professionalism, and only employed personnel with a strong, specialised skills set and 
relevant field experience. As these companies increased the number of contracts and 
introduced competitive pricing strategies, the hiring process became more relaxed. Engbrecht 
noticed that contracts were signed with “more spaces available than competent personnel to 
fill them.” 111This led to people with little experience, and questionable motives offering their 
services to the once, professional private industry. Previously, PMSCs “had been heavily 
dependent on former Special Forces personnel, and now had to cast its net much wider to 
recruit cheaper but perhaps not as qualified operators.”112 The perception of the PMSC 
industry had changed and they were no longer seen as legitimate service providers. PMSCs 
began to be associated with “the wild west, with people just jumping in on these multi-million 
dollar contracts.”113 An Iraqi insurgent described the new type of contractors as working “in 
Iraq to get large salaries and to help the American and Jewish pigs destroy Iraq.”114 The 
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professional ethos that PMSCs had worked hard to achieve and portray to the wider 
international world was quickly dissolving, as the need to fill contracts took priority over the 
standards in which they had aimed to build their foundations.  
 The lack of cohesion between PMSCs and the military sector can also have an adverse 
effect on counter-insurgency operations.  The main objective of the ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaign is to provide security to the vulnerable populations, therefore the private industry 
and military sphere must work together and provide a united front in order to ensure they are 
seen as legitimate providers of security. The recent conflict in Iraq illustrated how poor 
relations between the two groups harmed relationships with the local population. A lack of 
unity was evident between the groups, “they do not communicate in the same network (and) 
they do not get the same intelligence information, which carries obvious implications for the 
effectiveness of their role in counter-insurgency operations.”115 This heightened the distance 
between the two groups, and caused further friction within the operational space. The failure 
to present a united front adds greater confusion to the already complex counter-insurgency, 
pushing the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population further away from the counter-
insurgent’s grasp. 
 The military perceive PMSCs with a degree of hostility, which creates further 
divisions between the two sectors. Contractors work in the same operational space, yet enjoy 
greater financial rewards and have more choices regarding the environment in which they 
work. The resentment felt by military personnel heightens hostilities between the two groups, 
which can be perceived by the local population as a lack of commitment. Many soldiers 
“resent the way these firms exploit skills learned at public expense for private profit,”116they 
have great discontent for personnel who originally served in the military sphere before 
transferring to the private sector. The “sense of double standards for contractors is not 
helpful for morale”117, as military personnel “hear about the ‘cowboy’ attitude of security 
contractors, endangering regular military forces with their bravado, or  hearing of 
contractors under-performing doing an incomplete or substandard job, and then running 
away with the money.”118 Lehran found that “military were often outright hostile to 
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contractors for being amateurish, overpaid and often, trigger-happy.”119The distinct lack of 
cohesion is evident, as one US Private claims he “knew very little about the global security 
guys, we never worked with them, they did their thing and we did ours.”120 Colonel 
Cunningham admitted that “other commanders have refused to have anything to do with the 
sector at all, insisting that personnel under their command have no contact with 
them.”121Divisions between the counter-insurgent actors fuels the feeling of insecurity 
amongst the local population, which can impact ‘hearts and minds’ operations and lose public 
support. Avant discovered that “when the US sends PSCs and not military personnel, the host 
country perceives a lower level of US commitment.”122This also has an adverse affect on the 
‘hearts and minds’ campaign, as the local population will not lend their support to the 
counter-insurgent force if they do not perceive a sense of commitment or security.  
 The difference in operational objectives can have serious implications for counter-
insurgent forces. The objective of the military force is to counter the insurgency, and win 
over the local population through political incentives. The PMSC has been contracted into the 
operational space to complete a diverse range of tasks. These tasks can include guarding 
bases, acting as bodyguards for important political figures, or ensuring the safe passage of 
convoy patrols through dangerous areas. Critics argue that PMSCs only care about the task 
they are contracted to complete, and have little consideration for the wider operation. Staden 
states the “main objective of private companies is to serve the interests of shareholders, not 
the general interest in the sense of the success of the military operation, regardless of the 
risks involved.”123However, Singer claims that “their general goal is not violence for its own 
sake, but rather to achieve the task for which it was hired.”124 This view is evident amongst 
contractors who, when interviewed, admit to employing stronger tactics or confrontational 
behaviour in order to ensure their task is completed. Pelton stated “you can watch the TV 
blurbs about ‘hearts and minds’, but it is crap! When you are driving from the airport 
through the green zone you don’t give a shit about ‘hearts and minds’ you just want to get 
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through and back alive.”125 Another contractor, when questioned about the possibility of 
alienating the local population, claimed “if that means pissing off the Iraqis, too 
bad!”126Erratic behaviour alienated the local populations and caused greater resentment 
towards the counter-insurgent forces who had hired these companies. Chandrasekaran, an 
Iraqi living in Baghdad, highlighted how “they drove like they owned the place, sometimes 
crossing the median and barrelling towards oncoming traffic,”127causing fear and 
intimidation. Another account recalls how “they tear around in bullet proof Land Cruisers 
with tinted windows and no number plates…anyone getting too close may find the car door 
flies open and a Western Wildman points a machine-gun at him yelling ‘fuck off or I’ll 
shoot!’”128Lack of consideration for the wider operation is having a detrimental effect on the 
counter-insurgent’s aims of winning over the local population. Confrontational and erratic 
behaviour is alienating the population who believe these groups are working under the 
counter-insurgent’s command. With different operational objectives, and no unified goal for 
peace, PMSCs “only concern is to complete that mission and they will run cars off the road, 
stop the traffic and annoy Iraqis and not worry about it, even though it counteracts the larger 
counter-insurgency mission of winning ‘hearts and minds’ by treating the locals with respect 
and minimum inconvenience.”129 
 The notion that PMSCs operate directly under the command of the counter-insurgent 
is a myth that can have devastating consequences. The Iraq War highlighted how counter-
insurgent forces were perceived as being accountable for all the wrong-doings committed by 
PMSCs. Both the media and the local population held this view, which had serious 
implications for counter-insurgents hoping to win a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. Thurner 
discovered that “the local populace does not distinguish the military from contractors 
involved in operations.”130This resulted in military forces often facing greater animosity from 
the local populations, because “in their eyes, an American with a gun is an American with a 
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gun.”131Any incident which harms the local population will have a devastating impact on 
‘hearts and minds’, as the Abu Ghraib and Nisour Square incidents in Iraq demonstrated. 
Shimko recalls a group of soldiers watching the television as the Abu Ghraib news story was 
breaking, “when he asked what was happening, a private turned and told him that some 
‘assholes had just lost the war for us’.”132 Whilst Buzzell reported after the Nisour Square 
incident, “this would totally fuck us up, because our job was to basically win the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the Iraqi people. Now we had to start all over again!”133The military were aware 
that such incidents were harmful to their ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns but, with no 
accountability measures, they had no control over the matter and were simply “stuck with the 
consequences.”134 Singer noted that contractors, “while they may not be part of the actual 
occupying force, they are still perceived as such.”135Too many actors working within the 
same operational space caused greater confusion, resulting in local populations attributing the 
blame for contractor’s misdeeds to counter-insurgent forces. The failure to distinguish 
between the different groups caused counter-insurgent forces to lose legitimacy and support 
from the population that they were operating amongst, their home country and the wider 
international world. Particular incidents can also be used by the insurgent force to turn the 
local population’s support away from the counter-insurgent and towards their own cause. The 
use of PMSCs can destabilise trust, and undermine relations between the civilians and 
military forces as seen in Iraq, “the failure of contractors to safeguard Iraqi lives have been 
perceived as American failures.”136  
 Accusations of profiteering and corruption have plagued the PMSC industry, and 
questioned whether they are suitable to play a role in modern military operations. Certain 
PMSCs have been accused of partaking in financial scams and failing to provide the service 
they were contracted for. In 2005, Custer Battles won a $16.8 million deal to secure Baghdad 
Airport; they were “paid up front for x-ray equipment which they failed to acquire.”137Other 
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criticisms centre on the lack of reliability within the PMSC sector. Contracts have been 
abandoned, leaving those reliant on the PMSC stranded.  The Wartime Commission estimates 
that “at least $31 billion and possibly as much as $60 billion have been lost to contract waste 
and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”138 Polman 
discovered that due to PMSCs abandoning missions, large quantities of supplies and aid were 
left, which helped bolster the insurgency and created further implications for the counter-
insurgent. He notes, “unsupervised aid invites theft and corruption, which strengthens and 
multiplies Taliban support, leading to greater insecurity, which brings in more security 
companies, prompting even more hostility towards foreigners.”139 PMSCs have also been 
linked to allegations of corruption and bribery during the recent conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Singer claims that Iraqi nationals working as “private military contractors 
helped free Iraqi citizens from Iraqi jails.”140 Other critics suggest that contractors are paying 
local warlords or insurgents for a safe passage, in order to pass through certain regions, so 
that they can complete their missions successfully. The Wartime Commission claimed “their 
use for convoy security in parts of Afghanistan invites pay-for-protection extortion that 
diverts taxpayers’ funds to local warlords and insurgents.”141 Rather than helping to counter 
the insurgency, PMSCs partaking in actions of bribery and corruption are fuelling the 
enemy’s strength and capabilities. PMSCs have also been accused of providing false 
measurements of success during the training of local army and police forces, which does little 
to provide a realistic understanding of the operation, leading to inaccurate assessments which 
impact the overall operation. Allegations have also been made regarding the notion that 
PMSCs will purposely prolong a campaign in order to ensure greater financial benefits. 
Savage discovered that “President Karzai has voiced concern that extensive recruiting of 
local people in Afghanistan has undermined the national police and armed forces, as the best 
recruits join a highly paying European or American PMC,”142highlighting the damaging 
effect these groups can have on a country’s infrastructure. Enhancing the insurgency, 
abandoning missions and wasting financial resources all have a detrimental effect on a 
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counter-insurgency operation, therefore serious consideration needs to be made prior to 
contracting PMSCs and deploying them in this environment.  
 The decision to contract PMSCs during COIN operations can have serious 
implications for the counter-insurgent force. The lack of cohesion between the two groups 
can undermine the sense of security and unity which is needed to gain support from the local 
population. Issues concerning financial waste and unreliability have dominated public 
debates, and have a severe impact on the strategic success of an operation. The “use of 
overwhelming military force is inevitably counter-productive in counter-insurgency 
operations.”143 This notion is also relevant to those operating within the PMSC sector. 
Incidents of abuse by PMSCs have serious implications for counter-insurgent forces 
attempting to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local populace. Those working alongside 
counter-insurgent forces must be aware, that even the smallest errors can have a devastating 
impact on public opinion, and be used as ammunition by the media. This was highlighted 
during the Iraq campaign when Tatham “suggested that the Arab press would be naturally 
critical of the coalition, and would choose to focus on failures and setbacks, rather than 
positive achievements.”144 As Engbrecht noted “a failure in one area creates a ripple effect 
across the entire occupied population and reduces the overall chance of success.”145 Careful 
consideration needs to be made prior to contracting PMSCs; accusations of adventurous 
foreign policies and the benefits of ‘plausible deniability’ can be harmful to states. If the local 
population view the counter-insurgent’s use of PMSCs as a neo-colonialist excursion, then 
they are unlikely to offer their support, preferring to ally themselves with the insurgency. 
Outsourcing tasks to the private sector deprives the counter-insurgent force opportunities for 
active engagement with the local population; this fuels dissatisfaction and increases the 
feeling of alienation felt by the people. Due to outsourcing, the counter-insurgent force is 
losing the monopoly on violence and power within the region, with more actors operating 
within the field, the possibilities of abuse and error are enhanced, which could alienate the 
local population and cause a detrimental effect to the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign they are so 
eager to win. 
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Chapter Four: An Uncut Diamond: Recommendations for 
utilising Private Military Security Companies in future Hearts 
and Minds Campaigns 
 Whether PMSCs are able to play a role in modern counter-insurgency operations 
depends entirely on the ability to regulate these groups effectively, and make them 
accountable for their actions. Through initial research it has become evident that PMSCs 
could play an advantageous role in counter-insurgency operations, as they possess a range of 
skills that could benefit ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. The current conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have illustrated particular disadvantages associated with the use of these groups. 
Many of the implications associated with the private industry are based on the failure to 
regulate these groups, or the lack of reliable accountability measures. Therefore the ability to 
regulate these groups effectively, and implement a suitable accountability framework could 
improve the overall effectiveness of PMSCs, and enhance their position as a provider of 
strategic advantage for counter-insurgent forces. Academics have issued a range of 
recommendations they believe could be the key to regulating these groups, integrating them 
effectively into the wider international community.  
 The contracting process needs to be formalised in order to ensure legitimate 
companies are hired, and a regulatory framework exists from the beginning. Companies 
would need to prove they satisfy certain criteria prior to being accepted into the hiring 
process. The criteria should include background checks regarding the history of the company 
and detailed assessments of personnel operating for the company. Companies should also 
state whether they have previously operated under another business name. In 2007, 
Blackwater was banned from operating in Iraq, but company directors changed the company 
name to Xe, and they returned to Iraq with little resistance. Detailed background checks need 
to be completed on all personnel who could potentially be operating within the operational 
sphere. Stringent checks need to be in place regarding information on the following topics; 
criminal record, security, financial and medical conditions. Current regulations stipulate that 
background checks need to be completed prior to deployment. However this is too late as, 
once contracted, companies have no incentive to complete checks. Better screening and 
background checks need to be completed with plenty of time so that, if any irregularities or 
issues arise, the company can eradicate the problem prior to offering their services and 
entering the operational space. Isenberg suggested that, “firms that have been found to have 
overcharged governments in the past or have committed crimes in the contracting process 
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should be banned from applying for future contracts.”146 Singer proposed “subjecting PMF 
personnel databases to appraisal for past violations of human rights,”147highlighting how 
both contract personnel and the company need to be subjected to more stringent background 
checks. Only legitimate companies would be able to enter the contracting process reducing 
the possibility of errors and abuses. If PMSCs wish to operate as a business, they should 
provide portfolios which list the range of services they are capable of conducting, detailed 
reports of past contractual assignments and completion rates. PMSCs should also provide 
detailed accounts regarding their code of conduct and contingency plans for instances when 
contracts could be abandoned or possibly fail. They should satisfy these criteria prior to 
entering the contractual process, so that clients can examine and compare different 
companies, making informed decisions based on a range of factors, and not just the market 
price. By establishing a list of criteria which all companies must adhere to prior to entering 
the contractual process, will enhance transparency within the industry and formalise the 
hiring process for all actors involved.  
  A framework needs to be established in order to ensure states do not overspend or 
allow financial resources to be wasted. Due to the failure of an oversight process in Iraq, 
financial corruption and the disappearance of aid blighted the counter-insurgency effort, 
damaging relations with the local population. The hiring state needs to create a competitive 
market so PMSCs cannot take advantage by expecting their initial offer to be accepted. The 
US handed large sums of money to PMSCs operating in Iraq, without questioning the initial 
price or attempting to analyse whether the service was value for money. For many PMSCs, 
the ease of extracting large sums of money from states, without needing to provide 
justification, was too good an opportunity to miss. States need to implement a competitive 
pricing strategy to ensure the use of PMSCs offered “a cost-saving advantage, for that was 
the very reason private sphere services were sought in the first place.”148By ensuring a 
competitive pricing framework is installed into the contracting process, a set criterion will be 
established in order to ensure professionalism within the industry, removing the potential for 
financial waste.  
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 Contemporary academics propose that PMSCs could regulate themselves and do not 
need external regulation frameworks. Due to their corporate structure, PMSCs need to 
maintain a good reputation in order to gain employment and ensure high profit margins; 
therefore the companies will regulate themselves to ensure these objectives are met. 
Completing a contract successfully will enhance the company’s portfolio, thereby increasing 
the possibility for further contracts and greater profit margins. PMSCs are trying to promote a 
business identity, therefore those “who show high levels of professionalism will get more 
contracts.”149 Isenberg noted that “if a for-profit company were to lose money as a result of 
its employees’ behaviour, it will have more incentive to ensure its employees perform 
according to legal standards and contractual obligations.”150Whilst certain companies 
within the industry may be able to regulate themselves and care for their long-term corporate 
reputations, companies that enter the private sphere with short-term objectives and 
questionable financial motives will always exist. The option for self-regulation cannot be 
solely relied upon. Instead, hiring states should understand the business’ motivations and seek 
regulatory frameworks based on financial incentives. Academics, such as Avant, believe that 
profit is the life-blood of PMSCs;151 therefore the hiring state is best positioned to regulate 
these companies as they control the financial resources.  Within the policy and academic 
world, it has become widely acknowledged that “private security providers respond more to 
market incentives than to governmental priorities.”152 The option to reward and regulate 
these companies via financial incentives is an alternative worth exploring.  
 As well as regulating PMSC forces, academics and practitioners have suggested 
improving the training of PMSCs, and methods to promote greater cohesion with military 
forces. During the last decade, US and UK military forces have been heavily criticised for 
their lack of cultural training prior to deployment. PMSCs could also benefit from co-
ordinated cultural training, especially contractors who have limited cultural awareness of a 
particular region. Cultural training prior to deployment would enhance their understanding of 
the population in which they will operate, as well as providing basic language skills which 
would aid relations with the local communities. They also need to be familiar with host 
nation laws, international treaties and other codes of conduct. Military forces are subject to 
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training and lessons regarding the importance of ‘hearts and minds’ within population centric 
warfare, as well as methods and approaches used to interact with the people. Contractors 
could also benefit from this type of training, which would enhance their role and purpose 
within the counter-insurgency.  Dickinson suggested that “anti-corruption training would 
also be useful for foreign affairs contractors,”153and helps promote similar objectives 
between the military sector and private industry. As the operational sphere is constantly 
evolving, training needs to be completed prior to and during deployment. Phinney stated that 
“PMCs should take steps to ensure that the personnel recruited from third countries receive 
the same notifications and training as those recruited from the PMC home country.”154 All 
actors working within the counter-insurgency must be trained regardless of the task they are 
contracted to complete. The ‘hearts and minds’ campaign needs to be won by all actors, 
therefore anyone operating within the operational realm must understand the cultural 
situation, and the importance of such campaigns. Co-ordinating the training of personnel 
from both the military and PMSC industry, would also promote cohesion between the two 
groups, which would be beneficial in demonstrating a united front to the host population.  
 Promoting cohesion between the military and PMSC industry is a core objective for 
those hoping to utilise contractors in future counter-insurgency campaigns. Lack of cohesion 
between the two groups can leave the population feeling insecure and has resulted in a 
number of blue-on-blue incidents155, jeopardising support from the local communities and the 
home population of the counter-insurgent. In order to ensure co-operation between the two 
sectors, academics and practitioners have recommended that the military bring PMSCs into 
the planning process. The military can establish which tasks they need PMSCs to complete, 
as well as outlining the involvement of the PMSC prior to deployment. Greater unity during 
the planning process will give the different groups an opportunity to discuss their objectives, 
and eradicate any potential issues likely to occur. Working together during the planning 
process and prior to deployment is beneficial for all involved, as it allows both groups to 
amend or regulate any issues outside the operational space, where their actions and failures 
are likely to be scrutinised by the local population. Moesgaard highlighted the importance of 
interaction between the two groups in the planning stages, as it “ensures that private actors 
act according to, and support the overall strategy and tactics, so that they do not undermine 
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the over-arching aims.”156 Regular interaction between the two forces is needed as the 
operational landscape is constantly changing, therefore the military need to be able to 
“communicate new strategies to the private military companies so they can act in accordance 
with these strategies,”157and allow PMSCs to develop alongside the military force. 
Communication methods need to be accessible to both the military sector and private 
industry. Many of the issues during the Iraq conflict arose due to a lack of communication or 
mixed signals between the two groups. The sharing of certain communication lines and radio 
signals could bolster relations between the two forces. Many academics have also suggested 
that PMSCs sign an obligatory contractual agreement to ensure compliance with military 
initiatives. As well as signing a contract with the hiring state, they also sign an agreement 
with the state’s military force to formally regulate them into the military’s domain. It has 
been suggested that, once in the operational field, military commanders need to ensure the 
oversight of contractors working for PMSCs, stipulating these new actors fall under the 
military chain of command.158 Shevlin notes that “contractors should also have rules of 
engagement, codes of conduct and share the responsibilities that forces of the US government 
have entrusted to them in a combat structure.”159Sharing regulatory frameworks with the 
military would promote unity between the two groups, reducing the risk of confusion within 
the operational landscape. It would also ensure the military’s strategic objectives of winning 
the ‘hearts and minds’ were complied with. It has become widely accepted within the policy 
and academic field that “positive in-theatre management of contractors begins with the 
proper integration of contractors into the operational flow.”160 
 Despite PMSCs existing for nearly twenty years, international and domestic law has 
failed to incorporate these groups into legal frameworks. Whilst legal debates on the subject 
matter are ongoing, academics and practitioners have suggested a range of interim measures 
which could be implemented to provide accountability. The International Peace Operations 
Association (IOPA) is currently working on a document, establishing an ethical framework 
which they hope to be adopted by all companies operating in conflicts. Jackson suggested 
that “international tribunals are best positioned to convey a clear message that the 
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international community will not tolerate human rights violations and war crimes.”161 
International courts and tribunals enhance the idea that responsibility needs to be shared by 
all within the international community. Prior to 2007, contractors who committed crimes in 
Iraq were susceptible to prosecution in their home country. As many of the contractors 
originated from the USA and, despite inquiries, few were prosecuted; the wider communities 
perceived the legal framework as biased and viewed the lack of criminal proceedings as 
‘victor’s justice’. This angered Iraqis who perceived the USA to be condoning the 
lawlessness of PMSCs. The use of international tribunals promotes fairness and “allows 
governments to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses even when their crimes were 
committed in other countries, thereby universalizing responsibility.”162 Other academics 
believe a Global Licensing Scheme would promote accountability providing regulation for 
these groups. Companies would have to apply to the state in which they operate from, asking 
for a licence so that they can complete contracts abroad. 163 PMSCs would only be licensed to 
conduct the tasks in which their home government’s had permitted. If the PMSC committed 
an illegal act, as long as they had not strayed from their licensing agreements, they would be 
tried at an international court. If a PMSC was found to be operating outside of their licensing 
agreement, or without a license, then they would be subjected to the court system of the 
country in which they operated in. This process would incorporate legal incentives into the 
PMSC framework, as well as ensuring regulation by the home state and enhancing 
accountability measures. Kinsey suggested that the “licensing regime appears to have the 
support of many of those connected to the industry.”164States, PMSCs and legal bodies need 
to implement, promote and enforce legal, ethical and regulatory frameworks to ensure these 
new actors are made accountable for their actions, and can work within the international 
community effectively.  
 In order to ensure accountability and regulation, the PMSC industry could hire a 
Contract Manager. This position would hold great responsibility, ensuring all PMSCs 
working within a particular region are legitimate, abide by national and international laws, 
and act as an interim between the industry and other actors. Isenberg claimed that a Contract 
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Manager would be useful to ensure compliance and also help the new actor to lose the 
‘mercenary’ stigma.165 During the Iraq conflict, a Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction was established to ensure cohesion and compliance between the different 
humanitarian actors. The Contract Manager’s position would be based on and have a similar 
role, but focus purely on the PMSC sector. The position would also be responsible for 
conducting internal investigations and audits. Although the position would be beneficial to 
both the international community and the PMSC industry, problems arise regarding the 
employment of the individual. The individual would need to be separate from the conflict, the 
nation states, and the PMSCs operating within the field in order to ensure independence. 
 PMSCs need to be regulated efficiently so that they can play a role within, and be 
accepted by the international community. Practitioners are currently defining the industry and 
attempting to insert these new actors into international and national legal frameworks. 
Academics and policymakers have highlighted other recommendations, that if implemented 
and are attributable to all PMSCs, would prove beneficial in enhancing accountability 
measures, and ensuring regulatory frameworks are adhered to. As PMSCs are fairly new 
actors, they have yet to establish a firm legislative or regulatory criterion, therefore errors and 
confusion within the field remain. Sheehy noted there is “no silver bullet of regulatory 
innovation that will solve these issues,”166instead practitioners need to amalgamate a range of 
recommendations and frameworks, in order to create a suitable supervisory code of conduct 
that will draft these groups into international society. Improving the investigations process 
and formalising discipline procedures will demonstrate to the local populations, and the 
international audience, that these new actors are legitimate service providers who are able to 
provide a range of services beneficial to modern counter-insurgency operations, if effectively 
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 The corporate identity and choice of clientele has provided Private Military Security 
Companies with a sense of legitimacy, which has enhanced their position within the 
international arena. Those critical of the industry refer to the groups as mercenaries, claiming 
they operate within conflict zones purely for financial purposes and fail to possess any 
legitimate objectives. However, the vast majority of nation states, policy-makers and 
academics recognised that a new actor had emerged and increased their reliance on this force 
in the twenty-first century. Current military operations conducted by the US and her allies 
have struggled to achieve success due to the lack of personnel able to commit to lengthy, 
complex counter-insurgency campaigns. PMSCs were contracted during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan counter-insurgency operations in order to provide a much-needed troop surge, 
and enhance the counter-insurgent’s presence within the region. However, the most 
challenging aspect of a counter-insurgency operation is the ability to win the support of the 
local population through a dedicated ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. As PMSCs are operating 
in the same environment as counter-insurgents, they have the ability to provide a number of 
beneficial services to both the local community, and the counter-insurgent force, in which 
they work for. Recent conflicts demonstrated that these companies cannot operate 
independently without error, therefore careful consideration and planning is needed, which 
includes the implementation of strong regulatory frameworks, to allow PMSCs to operate in 
the operational space alongside counter-insurgent forces, and play a beneficial role in modern 
military operations.  
 Modern military operations have been conducted by coalition forces, which have been 
acknowledged to be beneficial to campaigns due to the international outlook and varying 
approaches of the contingency. Coalition forces provide a multitude of different styles, 
experiences, approaches and varying skill sets, which can enhance military operations and 
conduct. Using PMSCs to operate alongside military forces provides similar advantages to 
the use of coalition forces. PMSCs provide a range of personnel with different experiences 
and skills that could also enhance military operations. However, mechanisms need to be 
implemented within the contractual process to ensure PMSCs only offer professional 
personnel and services. Counter-insurgencies require more than a military presence; they also 
need personnel to provide security, aid and reconstruction duties. Therefore contracting 
personnel to complete these tasks can aid the overall counter-insurgency mission. PMSCs 
48 
 
offer these services whilst also adding to the military’s desire for a broad range of 
approaches, skills and experiences needed to conduct modern operations.  
Both the military force and PMSC work in the same environment and canvas the same 
populations, yet previous conflicts have highlighted how the military have failed to 
acknowledge these forces and reap the benefits they provide. PMSCs provide valuable open 
source intelligence and are able to produce extensive information on the local population, 
their geography and customs. This information is crucial when attempting to understand the 
local communities and win their support. PMSCs have greater opportunities to engage with 
the local people, often already possessing language skills or a similar identity, therefore are 
more likely to be treated as allies than the military, who have been suggested to promote fear. 
The knowledge that these companies have been drafted into the region to provide security to, 
and help the local community, also raises support and morale amongst the host nation. The 
force that provides security and stability in conflict will enhance their chances of being seen 
as legitimate, and ensure support from the local population. Contractors are often specialised 
in either security, or military fields, having a range of experiences and skills, and knowledge 
of operating amongst the people. Military forces need to open up channels of communication 
and training to ensure these benefits can be taken advantage of, and used by the military. 
Donald highlighted how PMSCs “provided a new boost to the process with translation, 
intelligence and protective security services, all increasingly vital to the heavier, wider and 
more vulnerable US military footprint.”167PMSCs can provide a range of benefits; but it is up 
to the military to utilise and integrate these advantages into the operational field effectively.  
New businesses take time to establish their position within the market, and often 
experiment until their product is good, and suitable for the demands of their clients. PMSCs 
are no different; they are still evolving in the corporate world and learning from their 
experiences and mistakes. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were effectively trial-runs as 
to how they could operate, and the ability to learn and adapt from experience is paramount. 
After each conflict, military forces and their actions are heavily scrutinised in order to 
understand failings, and how they can be prevented in future operations. Learning from 
experience is a key process for the military, and the actions of PMSCs should be subjected to 
the same critical analysis. Pelton notes that PMSCs are “evolutionary like any other 
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company,”168therefore branding them unworkable after their first operational experience is 
problematic. Critical analysis of these groups, both by company directors and military forces, 
needs to be made in order to ensure mistakes made during the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are not repeated again.  All “successful COIN operations are grounded in a 
cycle of ‘learning and adaptation’,”169and PMSCs should not be excluded from this process. 
  A number of issues exist that suggest the use of these companies is problematic for 
counter-insurgent forces. Aggressive and confrontational attitudes are likely to have a 
devastating impact on the counter-insurgent’s objective for winning ‘hearts and minds’. 
Incidents such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and Nisour Square incident damaged the 
‘hearts and minds’ campaign for counter-insurgents working within the region. Although 
committed by PMSCs, the blame was placed firmly at the door of the counter-insurgent 
forces, which were criticised for allowing these situations to unfold.  However, research has 
shown that such incidents in which PMSCs assert their aggressive behaviour towards the 
local population have been suggested to be quite low170. Appendix one suggests that only 
3.21% of military personnel had seen contractors commit threatening or belligerent actions, 
with 67.07% stating they had never seen contractors commit such actions.171 Any actor 
operating within a conflict could commit an act which can have a detrimental impact on 
support levels. As PMSCs are new actors, the media has asserted more attention to their 
actions, and press coverage has been negative in outlook. Unfortunately aggressive and 
hostile acts will always occur in a conflict environment; however, they are not solely 
committed by PMSCs, therefore rather than dismissing the utilisation of the companies, it 
would be beneficial to enhance accountability and regulatory measures to remove the 
possibilities of these acts happening again. “The privatization of security holds the potential 
to reduce fear as well as to enhance it.”172 These companies need to enhance their reputation 
as a legitimate service provider, and distance themselves away from the mercenary label. 
States need to ensure they do not over-rely on PMSCs to provide services, as this could lead 
to a significant weakening of the state’s monopoly on violence. Instead, states need to ensure 
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they opt for a framework and partnership with PMSCs in which they have the ability to use 
these groups, if and when needed, and the groups work harmoniously alongside their military 
forces towards a common objective. It is vital to ensure that states do not become “over-
outsourced to the point that it is unable to imagine carrying out its most basic operations 
without them.”173Further checks and balances need to be implemented to ensure PMSCs are 
not used by strong states, who do not wish to risk their reputation or desire the need for 
plausible deniability when conducting operations. Tonkin fears that the PMSC industry will 
transpire into “Swiss Cheese security coverage – full of holes – where security is covered only 
for those who have the means to pay for it.”174States need to maintain their sovereignty on 
violence, and ensure a breakdown of democratic values does not occur when integrating these 
private actors into the wider international community.   
 Military forces operating in modern counter-insurgency conflicts do not possess 
enough personnel to conduct operations effectively, nor do they have the breadth of cultural 
and language skills needed to operate amongst the people. PMSCs are able to offer skills and 
services which can augment the military’s capabilities when conducting operations in a 
counter-insurgency environment. For many, these groups are seen as the missing puzzle 
piece, as they offer a range of competencies which integrated effectively, will allow the 
military to continue operating with a light footprint, but through contracting, have the ability, 
skills and manpower to conduct a successful counter-insurgency operation. As Hoyne 
suggests, PMSCs should “not be at odds with a counter-insurgency strategy and should, in 
fact, enhance it.”175 PMSCs also have the potential to liaise with the local population and 
provide them with security; both will aid relations with the people and bolster the counter-
insurgent’s efforts in the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. However, PMSCs must understand 
that winning the ‘hearts and minds’ is a core objective for counter-insurgent forces and adapt 
their behaviour and processes to fit. Moesgaard acknowledged that “winning the hearts and 
minds’ of the local peoples- must be supported by all actors.”176Greater cohesion with 
military forces, commonly assumed objectives and ensuring PMSCs are accounted for in the 
planning process of a counter-insurgency operation, will enhance the success of these groups 
within the operational field. Whilst the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
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highlighted causes for concern, PMSCs are new actors and are still evolving; therefore the 
ability to acknowledge mistakes and create a dynamic learning process is critical. Private 
Military Security Companies have the ability to play a beneficial role in counter-insurgency 
operations, as they provide a range of beneficial attributes that can be used by counter-
insurgent forces, to conduct a successful ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. Stringent regulatory 
and accountability frameworks need to be developed to ensure compliance with counter-
insurgent objectives, whilst minimising any margins of error which could impact the local 
communities and, thus ruin efforts made to win popular support. Moesgaard notes, “nothing 
suggests that the private military companies undermine COIN, simply because they are 
private and fall outside the chain of command…it is a question of involving them in the right 
way and ensuring a coherent strategy and structure.”177Careful consideration needs to be 
made regarding the deployment of any actor into a complex counter-insurgency environment; 
therefore the deployment of PMSCs bears little difference. As a new actor, the Private 
Military Security Company offers a range of benefits for the counter-insurgent force, but the 
ability to regulate these groups effectively, and ensure accountability measures are in place, is 
paramount for the success of this actor in both the counter-insurgency field and the 
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